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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to study how the market reacts to a CEO 
appointment. Furthermore, it aims to find whether the executive gender or 
age of the CEO has an impact on the evaluation by market participants. The 
study will present the irrationality of investor by how they might 
discriminate the executive candidates by their demographic factors. The 
study is done in the U.S. market and the timeline is from year 2006 to 2015. 
The data considering the appointments is collected from ExecuComp and the 
exact announcement dates of the appointed CEOs are from American 
Business Journals, such as Wall Street Journal and Business Wire. The 
historical stock and index prices are collected from Yahoo Finance.  
 
The thesis first presents the research problem and studies related to it. First, 
it presents studies considering the discrimination towards demographically 
different people. Secondly, it presents studies about how the CEO of the 
company affects the stock price and the financial performance of the 
company. One purpose of the study is to combine the two phenomena. The 
effect of the CEO has on financial performance of the company has been 
researched a lot, but the fact how investor perceive demographically different 
executives to lead the company, has not gotten enough attention.  
 
Previous studies of the subject have found contradictory results. Mostly the 
results have shown the investor to react more negatively on female 
executives. The study tries to find whether the “glass ceiling” still exist and 
have the people become less conservative since the last researches of the 
subject.  
 
The thesis leads to a conclusion that the “glass ceiling” and the discrimination 
towards demographically different executives does not exist anymore. The 
investors do not react more negatively to appointed female CEOs compared 
to male peer candidates. In addition, the research does not find a significant 
difference between the reaction by investors towards appointments of 
differently aged CEOs. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1970s, the number of women in management in the United States 
was growing seemingly for over 25 years (US Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 1999). The proportion in 1976 was 21% and it increased to 46% 
in 1999 (Powell, Butterfield & Parent, 2002). Furthermore, the number of female 
CEOs in Fortune 1000 list was only seven in 1997 (Oakley, 2000). The percentage 
of female CEOs is growing globally but in other senior positions the increase has 
been slowing down. Internationally, the number of females in senior positions 
has increased by 3% to the level of 24% in the past five years. Businesses without 
any females in senior positions was at 33% and it didn’t change in the past five 
years (Grant Thornton, 2016).  
 
Why is the number of females in senior business positions so small? That is a 
question to which many researchers seek an answer. Naturally, the issue can not 
be explained with a certain answer but it is a combination of partial explanations. 
Powell et al. (2002) discuss a number of explanations for why it is so hard for 
women to reach a senior business position. For example, it could be due to 
stereotypes and discrimination. Stereotypes are “beliefs about the characteristics, 
attributes, and behaviors of members of certain groups” (Hilton & Von Hippel, 
1996, p. 240). Stereotypes of certain groups are often formed by demographic 
factors. It is easier to categorize people into large groups and remember them 
based on their demographic factors such as, gender and age (Klatzky, 2014). 
Morrison & Glinow (1990) state when appointing new seniors in company the 
executives tend to hire similar people measured by demographic factors in order 
to maintain certain authority and power with leaders. The authors argue the 
effect to be consistent with promotion allocation and other decisions. Since the 
majority of leaders are males and the present authority and power is achieved by 
majority of male leaders, individuals might argue a female executive to break the 
situation. According to Morrison & Glinow (1990) since the number of male 
investor beats the number of female investor, the appointment of a female CEO 
should have a negative impact on company’s stock price.  
 
The similar phenomenon has been studied by others as well. The similarity-
attraction paradigm was presented already in the 1970s (Byrne, 1971). The 
paradigm states people tend to spend time with others who are demographically 
similar to themselves. According to both discrimination and similarity-attraction 
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paradigm, the executives would select demographically similar people to other 
senior business positions. In addition, while major part of the existing top 
executives are white male, there is a tendency for white males being hired by 
current executives (Kanter, 1977; Powell, 1999; Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). Kanter 
(1977) discuss about numerical dominants and rare tokens. Skewed groups 
contain more dominants than rare tokens. Thus, one could argue dominants 
being males and rare tokens being females while appointing to senior positions.  
 
Powell & Butterfield (1979) study a good manager needs to have masculine 
features, such as independence and willingness to take risks, in order to be 
successful. Hence, women who pursue higher positions in a career should have 
masculine characteristics to gain the position. The twist makes it harder for 
women to succeed in their career and creates a disadvantage compared to male 
competitors (Powell, 1999). Since decision makers seek for a candidate with male 
characteristics and logically male more often have these characteristics, in most 
cases they choose a male for the position over equally-qualified woman 
(Heilman, 1995). Furthermore, when evaluating male and female manager 
performance, the decisions makers are favoring male managers in a situation of 
equivalent performance, due to their similarity (Bartol, 1999).  
 
The discrimination between male and female competitors in manager 
appointments has been studied a lot. However, there is not many studies about 
how investor react and what happens to the stock price when female top 
executive is appointed to company (Lee & James, 2007). Eagly, Makhijani & 
Klonsky (1992) suggest investor would be more critical to female executives than 
to male executives and investor would watch their action more carefully. By this, 
one can find a negative correlation between female top executive appointment 
and the investor and stock price reaction to the appointment.  
 
In the eyes of the investor, female CEOs are more positively received if they are 
promoted within a firm than coming from outside (Lee & James, 2007). 
Furthermore, this suggests a certain “glass ceiling” to exist in business life. Glass 
ceiling is determined as treating a person consciously or unconsciously by their 
demographical factors, in other words, discrimination. However, despite the 
discrimination, similarity paradigm and other possible explanations, females 
have managed to promote in their career to high senior positions (Lee & James, 
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2007). Since the number of women executives is increasing, does it indicate that 
the people have at least partly break the glass ceiling?  
 
The female senior managers and their performance has not been studied a lot, 
due to simple explanation, there has not been many of them (Martin, Nishikawa 
& Williams, 2009). Lee & James (2007) study the gender effects and stock price 
reactions to announcement of top executive appointments. The authors find the 
stock market reaction on female CEO appointment (-3,71 %) is more negative 
than with appointments on male CEOs (-0,49%) measured by three-day 
cumulative return. The overall results in the study support the fact that there 
actually is a glass ceiling and for women it is harder to reach the top management 
positions. Lee & James (2007) sample period consist of the years between 1990 
and 2000. The results are inconsistent with the previous studies where the stock 
price reaction to a CEO appointment are positive on average (Denis & Denis, 
1995).  
 
On the other hand, Martin et al. (2009) find cumulative abnormal returns on a 
three-day period are not significantly different between female and male CEO 
appointments. Hence, gender would not have an effect to investor judgment 
while valuating the risk of a company. In addition, when firms are facing a higher 
risk they are more likely to appoint female CEO to decrease the risk. Based on 
the studies mentioned above, this study examines whether people have become 
less conservative in 10 to 15 years by studying the effect of the stock market 
reaction on the stock price to top executive announcements from 2006 to 2015.  
 
The discrimination and categorization leads back to natural human behavior and 
to social psychology. Individuals categorizing others into particular social 
groups is an important issue in social psychology and has always been (Smith & 
Zarate, 1990). Social categorization allows the perceiver to evaluate the target by 
person characteristics and it may have an effect in a behavior towards the target 
(Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). In Turner (1987) research about the way people 
perceive others inside a social group, the social categorization is found as an 
important factor as well.  The results show that inside a group, when perceiving 
a person as an outsider have important consequences, even if the group does not 
have significant characteristic differences. The results are interesting on behalf of 
the subject of this study. It seems that people have a biological need to categorize 
people and categorizing others by demographical factors is an easy way to it. 
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People with a need to categorize others into social groups do not have to know 
the people they want to categorize. They can do it by demographical factors, such 
as gender, age or by ethnical background. In addition, an individual might have 
problems to trust demographically different people and the categorizing of 
others eases the issue. Since the beginning of humans, individuals have always 
categorized people and it might be a partial explanation of the current 
phenomenon. It might be a biological need to survive.  
  
 
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
 
The study examines the effect of a CEO appointment on company’s stock price. 
Previous studies have find contradictory results. Reinganum (1985) finds the 
impact of a CEO appointment on average to be statistically insignificant with 
stock market reaction. In contrast, Lee & James (2007) find the change is stock 
price to be statistically negatively significant with both, the appointment of a 
female and a male CEO. The research takes the issue to the 21st century and 
studies whether people have become less conservative in the past 10 to 15 years. 
By less conservative, the study means lower or no discrimination by investors 
towards demographically new or different CEO’s. Women are more and more 
common as company leaders so investors might have changed their way of 
thinking consciously or unconsciously in the past couple of decades. It it 
important to measure how investor perceive demographically different CEOs. If 
investor would act rationally, they would ignore the differences between 
different genders. However, previous literature shows there is a difference in 
how investor evaluate CEOs based on their gender. This study aims to find 
whether the problem has changed and does it still exist in the behavior by the 
marker participants. 
 
The research finds which one has more negative effect on stock price, the 
appointment of a female CEO or the appointment of a male CEO. Secondly, the 
study finds how the investor perceive CEO’s different age. The study is done 
with companies in the U.S. market and the timeline is from the year 2006 to 2015. 
By this, the study tries to find if a certain “glass ceiling” towards demographically 
different and new people still appears by investors. In other words, 
demographically different people, in this case, female managers might be seen as 
riskier option to lead the company. Therefore, discrimination due gender is an 
11	
	
	
issue. However, it is important to study other types of discrimination as well. 
Hence, the study also measures whether the investors react negatively to young 
and possibly unexperienced appointed CEO’s and takes the age aspect to the 
research as well.  
 
 
1.2. Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of the paper consists of a theoretical part and an empirical part. The 
theoretical part will at first present the previous literature of the field and will 
provide a wide presentation to the subject. The literature review will present 
Subliminal Signaling in the Market, Minority of Present Female Executives and 
Insecure Decision Making, which are all strongly related to the subject. In 
addition, it will present previous studies from the field of science more carefully. 
Chapter three concerns the change in the area of finance from rationality towards 
behavioral finance. It starts by introducing rationality, which was the dominant 
explanation in the financial markets only three or four decades ago. If the markets 
would be efficient, the research problem of the study would not exist, since the 
investor would be rational and would not leave space for emotions in decision 
making, such as discrimination towards demographically different people. In the 
eyes of an investor, the CEO candidates would appear similar and every market 
participant would make decisions completely rationally. 
 
Furthermore, chapter three explains the change in the market participant way of 
thinking and introduces the aspect of behavioral finance. Chapter four will 
measure how different demographical factors influence the individual behavior 
and how outsiders perceive the various demographic factors. Next, Chapter five 
will concentrate to researches made about the executive outlook and how it may 
have an effect on the success and financial performance of the company. In 
addition, chapter five presents stereotypical masculine and feminine 
characteristics and ponders how they may have an effect to individual success. 
After theoretical part, chapter six will present the Data and Methodology of how 
the research is done. Chapter six will go through the collection of data and 
explains how the data is exploited. Next, chapter seven will present the empirical 
results of the study through tables, figures and explanations. Finally, chapter 
eight will have a summary of the thesis and conclusions of the empirical study to 
end the research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The second chapter is going to present previous literature about the subject and 
make a preparation of what the theoretical part will consist. It will present 
previous studies from the subject during the last decades and provide basic 
information about the issue. The chapter will be a vast peek for the issue as a 
whole and will not emphasize into more accurate field before moving towards 
chapter three. In addition, it will introduce the most important previous studies 
concerning the subject. In the table below, are listed the articles cited in the 
chapter, which are used as a reference to back up the study.  
 
 
 
 
Studies Presented in Chapter Two 
Year Authors Name of the study 
1970 Akerlof The Market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty 
    and the market mechanism   
1986 Asquith & Mullins Equity Issues and Offering Dilution   
1998 Bazerman  Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 
1993 Boeker & Goodstein Performance and Successor Choice:    
    the Moderating Effects of Governance   
    and Ownership     
2001 Boudreau et al.  Effects of Personality on Executive Career 
    Success in the United States and Europe 
1995 Denis & Denis Performance Changes Following Top    
    Management Dismissals    
1992 Eagly et al. Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders:    
    A Meta-Analysis     
1991 Fiske & Taylor Social Cognition, 2nd.     
1977 Kanter Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life:  
    Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses    
    to Token Women     
2007 Lee & James  She'-e-os: Gender Effects and Investor    
    Reactions to the Announcements of    
    Top Executive Appointments   
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2009 Martin et al. CEO Gender: Effects on Valuation and Risk 
1986 Miller & Toulouse Chief Executive Personality    
    and  Corporate Strategy    
    and Structure in Small Firms   
1970 Nelson Information and Consumer Behavior   
2012 Peterson et al. Ceo Servant Leadership: Exploring Executive  
    Characteristics and Firm Performance   
2002 Power & Butterfield Gender and Managerial Stereotypes:    
    Have the Times Changed?   
2004 Ritchie et al. 
Individual Ececutive Characteristics: 
Explaining  
    
the Divergence Between Perceptual and 
Financial  
    Measures in Nonprofit Organizations   
1992 Shenhav 
Entrance of Blacks and Women into 
Managerial 
    Positions in Scientific and Engineering    
    Occupations: A longitudinal Analysis   
1973 Spence Job Market Signaling     
1973 Tversky & Kahneman Availability: A Heuristic for Judging    
    Frequency and Propability   
1993 Worrell et al.  Stockholder Reactions to Departures and  
    Appointments of Key Executives   
     Attributable to Firings     
1996 Zajac & Westphal Who Shall Succeed?      
    How CEO/Board Preference    
    and Power Affect the Choice of New CEOs. 
 
Table 1. The studies presented in Chapter two. 
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2.1. Personality and Behavior of an Executive  
 
Appointing a new executive is an important job due to success of a company and 
due to the reaction by the financial market participants. Furthermore, different 
personal characteristics have an influence to an executive success and it has been 
proved in several studies. For example, Boudreau, Boswell & Judge (2001) use 
the five-factor-model of personality, in other words, the “Big Five” to measure 
an executive performance by personal characteristics. In extension to “Big five” 
the authors use various dimensions of extrinsic (such as remuneration and 
ascendancy) and intrinsic (work, life and satisfaction in career) career success. 
The “Big five” personality traits include openness to experience, extraversion, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and agreeableness. The modified “Big five” –
model studies both direct and indirect effects of a group of human capital 
variables used in previous studies. The data in the study considers both 
American and European executives. Results show the neuroticism to impact 
negatively on intrinsic executives’ success in U.S. and European samples. In 
contrast, extraversion effects positively on success across both samples. 
Furthermore, conscientiousness is unrelated to extrinsic success and is negatively 
correlated with intrinsic success in both American and European sample. In 
addition, the willingness of an executive to agree on issues, is negatively 
correlated with extrinsic success in samples from U.S. and in Europe. The authors 
do not find many differences between the American and European sample. 
However, in American sample the neuroticism is correlated with smaller 
extrinsic success, while it does not have an effect in European sample. Also, 
extroversion has a positive impact to extrinsic success in European sample but in 
American sample it does not offer a significant correlation. All in all, in both 
samples, the human capital and variables of motivation are correlated with the 
predictability of career success, but rarely connected the relationship between 
personal characteristics and succession. (Boudreau, Boswell & Judge, 2001). 
Based on the results, market participants should give attention to boards choices 
especially when it is appointing a new top executive. The selection clearly has an 
impact on the firms’ financial performance. 
  
Miller & Toulouse (1986) examine the correlation between CEOs personality and 
firm performance. The three aspects measured are the need for achievement, 
flexibility and locus of control. The CEOs need for achievement was correlated 
with strategies focusing on marketing, with sophisticated structures and to 
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analytical decision making. The internal locus of control of an executive is 
connected with larger willingness to product innovation, are more orienting to 
future and these executives modify their approaches to different issues the firms 
are facing. The CEOs ability to be flexible is correlated with intuitive and risk-
related decision making. Furthermore, the effect of CEOs personality to firm 
decisions and performance has a larger impact on small firms and in dynamic 
environment. To conclude, the need for achievement did not have an effect on 
firm performance but the flexibility and and locus of control have an effect under 
certain circumstances (Miller & Toulouse, 1986). The results suggest a CEO who 
is ambitious and seeks for achievements does not contribute to firm performance. 
On the other hand, a flexible CEO has a positive impact on the success of the 
firms, maybe showing as a greater dedication for the company.  
 
Peterson, Galvin & Lange (2012) study relationship between CEO characteristics 
and ability to servant leadership of technology organizations. In other words, the 
study finds a correlation between CEO characteristics and company success. The 
CEO narcissism has a negative impact on servant leadership. In contrast, if the 
CEO is the founder of the company as well, it has a positive impact on servant 
management. Furthermore, a servant leadership by the CEO is positively 
correlated with positive firm performance. Based on the results can be said a 
liked and operationally involved CEO to have a positive impact on the financial 
performance and likely to the atmosphere as well. Also Ritchie, Anthony & 
Rubens (2004) measure the executive characteristics and firm performance. The 
study is concentrated to examine nonprofit organizations. The results show an 
executive with locus of control, analytical styles on decision making and high 
collectivism values to have a higher convergence performance perceptions and 
ability to measure the financial performance. The study finds support to previous 
literature, which prove executive characteristics to have a significant effect in 
handling information and, by this, improving the ability to make perceptions. In 
addition, the executive characteristics have an effect to strategic choices of a 
company, which might affect the financial performance of the company. All in 
all, investor should be critical towards new executives, since everyone is different 
and the previous literature proves a connection to exist between the CEO of the 
company and the financial performance of the company.  
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2.2. Subliminal Signaling in the Market  
 
Market signaling is referred when one party sends information either consciously 
or unconsciously to another party in the market. For example, the employee 
attaches an education credential to a job application to prove to the employer he 
or she is suited for the job (Spence, 1973). The market signaling phenomenon can 
be connected to Akerlof (1970) when he presents the good investments and the 
bad investments, so called “lemons”. When a person decides to purchase a new 
car, he or she can choose between new or used car. Furthermore, the car can be 
good or bad (a lemon). In these situations, it is familiar that the seller knows more 
about the product than the buyer, which leads to information asymmetry and to 
“moral hazard” problem. After owning the purchased car for some time, the 
buyer really knows the quality of the product. The problem with “lemons” can 
be connected to goods whose quality cannot be proved and which may affect 
information asymmetry (Nelson, 1970).  
 
Additionally, the market signaling theory is present when companies disclose 
announcements, such as post-earnings-announcements or reporting of a new top 
management appointment. The companies can gain positive or negative 
abnormal returns by these announcements through investor reaction by buying 
or selling the firms stock (Asquith & Mullins, 1986). Negative announcements, 
such as negative post-earnings announcements can send signals about a firms’ 
future difficulties, which may result as investors selling their stocks, leading to 
decreasing stock price of the company. By this, companies might not do this on 
purpose and they might have some other plans to improve the company’s future.  
 
Lee and James (2007) study the market signaling to understand investor reactions 
to top management female executive appointments. The authors purpose of the 
study is to produce information about how outsiders perceive firm diversity. 
Women currently hold 20 (4,0 %) of the CEO positions in S&P500 companies 
(Catalyst, 2016). Based of the context, the nomination of a female CEO may send 
negative signals to the market (Lee & James, 2007). Lee & James (2007) collect the 
sample of appointing top executives from Wall Street Journal between 1990 and 
2000. The study examines stock price reaction to the announcements. The study 
is not biased towards large or small firms since the data is collected using all three 
exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ. The results find a three-day cumulative abnormal return to be -0,49 
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per cent for male CEO and for female CEOs -3,71 per cent. In addition, the impact 
in stock price is more negative with female CEOs than other female top 
management team appointments (0,83 per cent). Third hypothesis, which 
predicts stock price to be more negatively affected by female top management 
appointments than male top management appointments is rejected in the study. 
In addition, the results show the women top executives to be received more 
positively when promoted inside the firm, rather than coming from the outside. 
The results do not find a significant correlation between the change in stock price 
and whether a female executive is hired outside the industry or promoted inside 
the industry (Lee & James, 2007). Thus, the results indicate the “glass ceiling” 
only to exist on high position appointments such as CEOs and no to exist in 
middle management positions in female top management team appointments.  
 
 
2.3. Minority of Present Female Executives 
 
As mentioned, the proportional number of female executives is substantially 
lower than the number of male executives. While forecasting the success of an 
appointed CEO or other top management appointments, one can evaluate many 
factors, such as age, education, previous experience and whether the person is 
promoted inside the firm or hired from the outside (Lee & James, 2007). Older 
manager is likely to have more experience, so longer experience is followed by 
better success. A large part of the CEO succession research is focused distribution 
between managers hired outside of the firm and promoted inside. Furthermore, 
the studies focus on does the appointed person has previous experience inside 
the industry (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). Zajac & Westphal (1996) state focusing 
should be expanded from insider/outsider characteristics to concern other 
fundamental demographic characteristics as well. In a changing world and with 
increasing number of female managers the gender characteristics also needs 
attention (Lee & James, 2007).  
 
While Lee & James (2007) discovered significant differences between the investor 
reaction on female and male executive appointments and the number of women 
in top management positions has increased since their research, the situation 
provides a chance to see whether the scenario has changed. Since the number of 
female executives is lower, the investor might be more aware of the nomination 
of female executives than of male executives. The logic behind the particular 
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phenomenon is female executives being new and different, therefore, presenting 
a proportional rarity of all executives in the United States (Lee & James, 2007). 
Kanter (1977) presents an example of proportional rarity. If a person observes 
nine X’s and one O, 
 
 
X  X  x  x  X  X  O  X  x  X 
 
 
the O gets more amount of attention, despite the fact, that there might be more 
diversity within the X’s. Berlin School of experimental psychology presents the 
field of Gestalt psychology. According to its principles, those who people see as 
common become the “ground”, and uncommon are seen as “figure”. In this 
context, male can be seen as “ground” and female as “figure”, leading the female 
executives getting extra attention from the stakeholders.  
 
While female executives represent the minority of total executives, investor don’t 
have the same background to evaluate her than with male executives who can be 
compared better by larger number of other male executives. One might think the 
new female executive is riskier than a new male executive (Lee & James, 2007). 
In fact, the roles of executives have deformed with masculine characteristics since 
they have been by majority held by men, so men in executive positions are 
measured more positively than women (Eagly, Makhijani & Klonsky, 1992). In 
addition, the women hired to top management positions are breaking gender-
role expectations (Fiske & Taylor ,1991). Since men at the moment hold a major 
part of top executive positions, people see men as having a better background for 
managing in the job, while forgetting other succession evaluation factors (Power 
& Butterfield, 2002). To conclude, people see men are more likely to have 
masculine characteristics which are appreciated in senior management positions 
so they prefer male into these positions (Shenhav, 1992). According to statements 
above, people would see a hired or promoted female executive more negatively 
than a male top executive. By this, investor see female executives as proportional 
rarity and would impact more negatively on an appointment by selling the stock 
and resulting as a decrease in company’s stock price.  
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2.4. Insecure Decision Making 
 
Like proportional rarity, the studies in decision-making can be helpful to explain 
gender effects while measuring stock market reactions. Kahneman & Tversky 
(1973) conclude that people do not like uncertainty or ambiguity in decision-
making. People rather are sure about what will happen than what might happen 
(Bazerman, 1998). Therefore, we will have an extra effort to control the possible 
results (Lee & James, 2007). Hiring a new top executive is usually associated with 
uncertainties and it can result in insecurity by investors causing the stock price 
to decrease (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Uncertainties arise in a situation where the 
hired executive is new and especially when the person is female, because women 
are relatively new to lead the company. Person promoted inside the company is 
not considered as new and as risky option than a person hired from the outside 
(Lee & James, 2007). However, the markets reaction to hiring a CEO from outside 
is significantly positive while promoting a CEO from inside the company has no 
significant effect on the stock price (Worrell, Davidson & Glascock, 1993).  
 
As we can see, the previous literature offers contradictory and inconsistent 
results about the subject. Lee & James (2007) find the stock price on average to 
respond negatively on CEO appointments by both male and female 
appointments. The results are in contrast with several studies which find the 
stock price to react positively on CEO appointments (Denis & Denis, 1995; Martin 
et al., 2009). The reason might be the usage of different timelines and other 
dissimilarities in the samples. Quantitatively, the sample used in the study 
extends the female executive appointment observations used in previous 
researches. By this, the study aims to give support for previous studies. All in all, 
it is an interesting subject and the research encourages further research to 
consider the issue as well.  
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3. FROM RATIONALITY TO PSYCHOLOGY  
 
Traditional financial theory says that investors make their decisions 
rationally and leave no space for psychology or emotions. For example, the 
demographic differences of an appointed CEO should not have an influence 
to investor decisions, since the traditional financial theory assumes market 
participants to act rationally. This chapter is going to explain how investors 
nowadays take influence to their decisions by also psychological feelings, 
either consciously or unconsciously. This chapter will present the efficient 
market hypothesis, when people started to hesitate the efficient market 
hypothesis and finally what has actually happened to peoples’ perspectives 
to change their behavior in investing.   
 
 
3.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Market efficiency can be divided in to three sections: weak forms, medium 
forms and strong forms. When markets perform weakly, securities prices 
reflect all information related to earlier trades, which is taken from the past 
prices and trading volumes. Technical analysis, which means concerning all 
the quantitative information such as price and trades and only a bit of 
investors moods, is not helping at weak forms. As medium forms are 
prevailing, securities prices reflect all the public information. Fundamental 
analysis means researching corporations’ profits and the economical basics 
trying to determine are the shares prices at a right stage comparing them to 
fundamental factors. Fundamental analysis does not help at medium forms. 
When strong forms are prevailing, prices reflect all information including 
non-public information known as the insider information. (Fama, 1970).  
 
Fama (1991) presents a modified theory about efficient market levels, where 
testing can be divided into three divisions. First one, the weak forms, is the 
predictability of profits: can historical market information predict profits. In 
this division a cross-sectional analysis by using for example B/M or earlier 
dividends to predict profits is a big part. Also technical analysis and calendar 
anomalies are used in this section.  
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When medium forms are prevailing Fama presents the event-studies. The 
event study methodology measures how certain actions like earnings 
announcement or changes in capital structure reflect the market and the stock 
prices. For strong forms, Fama shows test for insider-information. Event-
studies at medium forms try to find out what is the abnormal return. This can 
be done by deducting expected returns from actual returns. Abnormal returns 
can be defined by three methods. The simplest one is the market-adjusted 
returns: deducting the market returns from actual returns, so market returnn 
is the same as expected returns. The second one is returns adjusted by market 
model: deducting expected returns from actual returns, where the systematic 
risk is taken into account.  
 
Third one is commonly known as Fama-French three-factor model (Fama & 
French, 1993). Model shows that shares expected return is a cause of three 
factors: shares systematic risk, size of the corporation and value-factor. In 
1992, Fama & French research that Capital Asset Pricing Model doesn’t fully 
explain the stock returns. They found that value stocks do better in the market 
than growth stocks, when at the same time small cap stocks do outperform 
the large cap stocks. Stocks value depends not just on market risk but also the 
size of company and the company Book-to-Market value.  
 
The model uses estimated alphas and betas to define expected returns. The 
model calculates expected returns by defining the systematic risk, deducting 
big corporations’ profits from small corporations’ profits and deducting low 
book-to-market value from high book-to-market value. After defining the 
expected returns models works as the second alternative: deducting expected 
returns from actual returns to get the abnormal returns. Fama-French-model 
formula looks like:  
 
 
(1.) et = Rf + B(Rm – Rf) + B SMB + B HML + a 
 
 
where Rf is the risk-free return rate, Rm is the return of the market portfolio, a is 
alpha, B is Beta estimated first with deducting big corporations profit from small 
corporations’ profit (SMB) and then deducting low book-to-market value out of 
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high book-to-market value (HML). Formula in the bracket calculates the expected 
profit.  
 
Capital Asset Pricing-model (CAPM) in finance is used to determine a security’s 
expected rate of return. According to Capital Asset Pricing-model the rate of 
return on capital can be calculated by adding detailed beta multiplied by the 
average market risk premium to risk-free interest rates.  
 
(2.) E(Ri) = Rf + Bi (E(Rm)- Rf) 
 
Where E(Ri) is the expected earnings being calculated, Rf is risk-free interest 
rates, Bi is shares beta and E(Rm) market portfolio expected earnings.  
 
To be functional, the Capital Asset Pricing-model assumes the following parts 
to occur: 
 
1. No transaction costs 
2. The investments are perfectly divisible 
3. No taxes 
4. Markets are perfectly competitive (Investor can not affect the prices.) 
5. Investors compliance with portfolio theory 
6. Short selling is allowed 
7. Borrowing and lending are possible at the same rate 
8. Investor expectations are homogeneous 
9. All capital assets are traded 
 
 
3.2. From Efficient Market Theory to Behavioral Finance 
 
In the 1960s, when the efficient market hypothesis had existed over a decade 
and really taken into concern, it reached also huge empirical and theoretical 
success (Schleifer, 2000). Academics in the field created theoretical proves 
why this hypothesis should hold. The efficient market hypothesis was 
invented at the University of Chicago and rightly it became a center of the 
academic field of finance.   
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In the 1970s, the efficient market theory was at its highest valuation. The 
efficient market theory was observed widely without suspicion. In the 1970s, 
the rationality in stock changing was at its beginning and stock prices change 
only because of rational information was contiguous with prevailing trends 
(Shiller, 2003).  
 
Lucas Jr. (1978) shows that when rational expectations guide the actions, 
rational asset prices may have a predictable feature connected to the 
predictability of consumption. Breeden (1979) published his theory 
“consumption betas”. Beta is used as a factor to measure the sensitiveness of 
shares return comparing it to some index. In Breeden (1979) theory beta is 
defined by the correlation of the shares return with per capita consumption. 
Both, (Lucas, 1978) and (Breeden, 1979) theories brought new point of view 
to existing theoretical studies at the time (Shiller, 2003).  
 
In the 1980s started the hesitation towards the consistency of the efficient 
market theory. The existing anomalies that were uncovered may be examined 
at worst small deflection from the hypothesis of market efficiency, but if a 
great part of stock markets volatility is in the dark, the questioning of efficient 
market theory is a correct thing to do (Shiller, 2003). Although, in the mid-
1980s there were only a few written academic papers about behavioral finance 
from researchers like Robert Shiller, Larry Summers and Richard Thaler 
(Schleifer, 2000). 
 
 
3.3. Psychology 
 
Psychology is a field of science which studies human activity. By this, human 
psychology is an important factor to explain how market participants behave 
irrationally. Furthermore, traditional framework that consists out of rational 
investors and where are no frictions means that securities price equals 
company’s fundamental value. When investors act irrationally it follows as 
deviations in fundamental value and rational traders can’t do anything about 
it (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Nowadays researching investor irrational 
behavior economists turn to researched evidence about investor preferences 
and how they form their beliefs.  
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3.4. Beliefs 
 
Investors’ way of making expectations is an important part of any model in 
financial markets (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Securities prices form out of 
agents’ actions and investors decisions are a substantial part of it. 
Psychologists have studied how investors form these beliefs in practice.  
 
Overconfidence means that investors are too confident with their decisions 
and judgments. Overconfident investors make more trades than less-
confident investors (Odean, 1998). This leads to greater transaction costs. 
Odean (1998) states that investors which tend to be overconfident towards 
their performances, believe that they make better choices than other 
investors. However, Odean states that investors who made most trades 
received a lot smaller profits than the market participants on average.  
 
Weinstein (1980) says that 80 percent of the people are too optimistic in their 
everyday-life. Montier (2002) nominates optimism or wishful thinking is one 
of the best psychological errors. For example, a number of drivers were asked 
about their driving skills. 80 % of the drivers stated themselves as good 
drivers. If every other is good driver the result should have been 50 %. As 
Parallel, Frey and Stutzer (2002) say that people are optimistic that a positive 
event is more likely to concern them than others, however, the possibilities 
are even. Returning a single lottery ticket gives you exactly same possibilities 
to win as to the other lottery players.  
 
Conservatism means reluctance to change things. There is a paradigm that 
earlier studies are proven to be truth and we should blindly trust them. 
Investors weight too much on earlier evidence when they should equally pay 
attention to new samples.  
 
Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) present evidence that changing your once 
formed opinion is difficult to people. People don’t want to search information 
that doesn’t match with their existing opinion. In a situation they have to be 
in touch with polar information they are very reluctant to agree with it and 
are very skeptical. Known as confirmation bias, investors try to find evidence 
that is similar with their existing view (Montier, 2002). People for example 
denied investors irrationally for a long time despite all the academic 
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researches made to prove it through. Efficient market hypothesis was so 
widely accepted and proven to be true that to some people it was difficult to 
grant.  
 
Availability heuristic means searching information to help your decision that 
is already available rather than trying to search alternatives and new sources. 
People use their own experiences to prove the point. Acquaintanceship is one 
example. If your middle-aged aunt suffered a heart attack you might use it as 
a proof to middle-aged greater chance of having a heart attack. When your 
best friend gets mugged in Helsinki your conclusion to this subject may be 
that Helsinki is a violent city. All in all, it is important to review the 
psychological traits of individuals before moving to further chapters. It is 
important to understand why people act irrationally, which might lead for 
example to discrimination towards demographically different people.  
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4. MEASURING RISK BY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 
Investors seek a suitable way of gaining returns by finding a match between risk 
and return. In other words, investors are risk averse. Risk averse means an 
investor, who finds two investment opportunities with the same expected return 
and chooses the one with the lower risk. Previous literature presents the investor 
see female CEOs riskier than male CEOs leading them to risk averse by 
demographical factors. Khan & Vieito (2013) challenge the behavior. The authors 
find on average the company led by female CEO contains less risk than a 
company led by male CEO. In addition, while the board of the company is 
determining compensation packages, they are not considering risk aversion 
differences. Based on previous studies women are more risk averse leaders than 
men and should be rewarded by the compensation packages (Jianakoplos & 
Bernasek, 2008 and Schubert et al. 2000). Khan & Vieito (2013) also find 
companies led by female CEOs perform better on average than companies led by 
male CEO’s.  
 
Peltomäki, Swidler & Vähämaa (2015) examine the effects of age and gender of a 
top executive to organizations level of risk. The data in the research is collected 
from the S&P 1500 companies. The authors find with an older CEO or CFO the 
company’s the stock returns are less volatile and the levels of idiosyncratic risk 
are lower. The correlation between executives’ gender and the risk of a firm are 
not so clear. However, the research finds a negative correlation between female 
CEO and riskiness of a company, but shows firms with a female CFO might be 
riskier. Furthermore, the study shows female executives to be younger on 
average than male executives. Hence, correlation between executive gender and 
risk of a company is diffused by the effects of age. Thereby, the research on this 
subject should be made by controlling both age and gender to get accurate 
results. (Peltomäki, Swidler & Vähämaa, 2015).  
 
To date, previous literature has shown a significant correlation between the 
company succession and the personality or behavior of a CEO (Agle et al., 2006). 
Logically, demographical factors might have an impact on behavior or 
personality. On the other hand, one problem arises from the studies that measure 
the correlation between CEO behavior and performance. This is, due to fact CEOs 
behavior being mostly measured by insiders, for example, other members in top 
management team or CEOs themselves. However, recent studies have shown 
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statistically significant information concluded from the results by complete 
strangers to CEO (Rule & Ambady, 2008).  
 
This part of the study will present how investors measure the risk by 
demographical factors such as gender, age and education while finding a perfect 
relationship between the risk of the investment and expected return.  
 
 
4.1. Gender 
 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) occurs when a company makes the first sale of its 
stocks to public. Khrisnan & Parsons (2008) find companies with higher diversity 
and larger number of women top executives to result in higher profitability and 
greater stock returns after IPO. Based on previous literature, women are under-
evaluated by investor due to their gender. Thus, female-headed companies 
would outperform investor expectations resulting in excess returns (Wolfers, 
2006). Financial markets and especially the stock prices provide information 
about the beliefs towards abilities of male and female executives by the investors. 
Furthermore, the information might show characteristics of discrimination 
towards demographically different senior managers by the market participants.  
 
Despite the fact Wolfers (2006) finds no significance about discrimination, the 
study needs to be taken into concern. The author uses example of investors who 
mistakenly think companies led by women executives earn 10% less than with 
male CEOs. The way market participants value the company can be seen from 
their expectations towards the company. By this, if female CEO were to live in 
eternity, the valuation of her firm would be 10% less than by same company led 
by male CEO. However, the investor consciously or unconsciously knows the 
fact that the CEO tenure in average is 10 years, thus, resulting the investor to 
discount both the future by 0,5% per month and every month presents a 0,8% 
chance of a change in CEO position. In addition, the chance of a company hiring 
a new female CEO, who the investor would underestimate, is 2,5% based on CEO 
appointments since the 2000. Wolfers (2006), compares the pieces resulting in 
3,9% discount for companies with a female CEO. This is even more to Lee & 
James (2007) study, where the authors find the stock price to decline 3,71% on 
average after a female CEO appointment. By this, the event study provides 
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information about the perceptions and discrimination towards the ability on 
female CEOs.  
 
 As mentioned, Martin et al. (2009) don’t find significant results about 
discrimination on behalf of the investors towards female CEOs. However, the 
authors find changes in risk are significantly lower for female CEOs. By this, the 
market can be seen as perceiving female CEOs to be risk averse. In addition, the 
research finds companies with higher risk to be more willing to appoint a female 
CEO, possibly to decrease the risk. The suggestion is contradictory with the 
results by Lee & James (2007).  
 
The effect on the appointment of a CEO has been studied by many authors, 
resulting in contradictory results. Reinganum (1985) does not find a statistically 
significant correlation between a CEO appointment and stock price. Secondly, 
Denis & Denis (1995) find the correlation to be significant and positive. In 
contrast, Lee & James (2007) find to correlation to be negative with both, a 
nomination on a male CEO and an appointment of a female CEO. This can 
indicate investor having difficulties on judging and evaluating female CEOs due 
to the fact that there is not a framework to compare with.  
 
 
4.1.1. The Impact of the CEO’s Gender on Risk 
 
Beatty & Zajac (1987) reported when changing a CEO, it might have an affect to 
perceived risk. In extension, Martin et al. (2009) find a significant correlation 
between the appointment of a new CEO and the change in risk. Previous 
literature shows a few occasions where market participants evaluate the financial 
risk by gender. Lee & James (2007) say investor judging female CEOs is because 
they are relatively new to lead a company. On the other hand, it has been studies 
that women are less willing to take risks while leading the company comparing 
to male executives (Powell & Ansic, 1997). The behavior of female investors can 
also be taken into consideration. Jianakoplos & Bernasek (1997) find the women 
investor to be more conservative and to include less risky investments in their 
portfolio than male investors. In addition, Barber & Odean (2001) find female to 
be less risk averse when investing by their common financial instruments. To 
conclude, these studies support the fact of female executives having higher risk 
aversion degree than among male executives.  
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Women invest less than men and they invest to less risky investments than 
men. Results show that women have a tendency to invest on money market 
fund and fixed income fund. On the contrary, men tend to invest on riskier 
instruments like shares and mutual funds. On the other hand, men are more 
willing to make changes in their investments when profits are not at the 
expected level, in contrast to women who rather wait in these situations. (Hira 
& Loibl, 2008). Such behavior by female investor can to connected to the fact 
that women are less risk averse the male CEOs. The change in risk has also 
proved to be significantly lower with female CEOs relative to male CEOs 
(Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 2008 and Schubert et al. 2000).  
 
 
4.1.2. The Impact of a CEO’s Gender on Valuation 
 
The previous literature does not clearly show a significant correlation between 
valuation and appointments of a female CEO (Martin et al. 2009). Hisrich & Brush 
(1984) argue the companies owned by male outperform the companies owned by 
female. Oakley (2000) state people usually stereotype female being less 
competent managers. Females have also been seen as having less confidence in 
financial ability, thus, making it harder for women to loose the stereotype (Estes 
& Hosseini, 1988). In addition, studies have shown the funds managed by female 
getting less money by customers than funds managed by men (Atkinson, Baird 
& Frye, 2003). According to Lee & James (2007) while market participant is 
valuating the company the gender bias does exist.  
 
Prior to Lee & James (2007), the literature does not provide support for their 
results. Johnson & Powell (1994) do not find differences in decision making with 
female and male executives. Firms who have two or more female top executives, 
do not gain lower return on assets measured by Tobin’s q (Carter, Simkins & 
Simpson, 2003). In addition, many studies have shown female investor to be as 
successful as male investors (Estes & Hosseini, 1998; Barber & Odean, 2001; 
Atkinson, Baird & Frye, 2003). These findings suggest that while market 
participants are valuating a company, it should not matter whether the appointed 
top executive is male or female. 
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4.2. The Impact of a CEO’s Age on Risk and Valuation 
 
Age is a lot researched affecting factor to investors’ perspectives and behavior 
in investing. With age comes a decline in general intelligence. This happens 
for two reasons. First, the level attention and memory decrease cause of the 
negative influence of aging. Second is the decrease of sense (Baker & 
Nofsinger, 2010). The decrease of intelligence gets much worse after the age 
of 70 (Baltes & Linderberger, 1997). On the other hand, decades lasting effort 
in financial markets will create a lot of expertise.  
 
Investment advisors recommend investors to move from shares towards 
more safe financial instruments as they get older. Advisors state their reasons 
on shares smaller risk to young investors due to their longer investment 
horizon. Younger people have also more financial obligations to be filled. In 
the Unites States tuitions are expensive. This particular obligation does not 
occur for example in Nordic countries but saving for an own apartment is one 
possible opportunity to make savings. In addition, justifying younger 
investor greater need to invest on stocks, they will have a greater amount of 
years to work to cover their possible losses (Jagannanthan & Kocherlakota, 
1996). The authors evaluate these pretensions above with economic science 
and they state that the only reason to invest more on stocks at young age is 
that the younger people have more years of work left and this way more 
expected income pending. Jagannathan & Kocherlakota (1996) shoot down 
the claims about longer horizon and financial obligations.  
 
Using the similarity-attraction paradigm, Davidson, Nemec & Worrell (2006) 
find board members are more likely to appoint a CEO close to their own age. 
The authors find a significant and positive correlation between the age of 
board members and the age of the appointed CEO. By this, the similarity-
attraction paradigm seems to guide the decisions while appointing new 
executives. Furthermore, Davidson et al. (2006) find a slightly positive 
correlation between appointing age-similar CEO and company’s financial 
performance. Hence, while investors are measuring the risk and valuating a 
company, they might also expose to similarity-attraction paradigm which 
leads to discrimination when companies hire new executives.  
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Brickley (2003) examines the effect of a CEO turnover and performance of the 
firm. The authors find the age is more important variable while explaining 
CEO turnover-rate than explaining the succession of a company, so the issue 
need to be discussed in this study as well. The evidence from the research 
suggests the probability of CEO leaving the company is almost 30 percent 
higher when the executive is over 64. Thus, while market participants 
compare the options and valuate the company based on a CEO nomination, 
an older executive might be seen as a risky alternative, since the opportunity 
to leave the company in a given year is significantly higher.  
 
With age comes experience and longer experience by top executive might 
result in higher appreciation by market participants. Similarly, age has been 
seen as a proxy for gained experience and future expectations of a CEO 
(Cannella & Shen, 2001). Human capital and social awareness increase with 
experience and age. Effectiveness might also increase with age. Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan (2011) measure the impact in the amount of boards 
human capital on market reactions while appointing a new CEO. Hiring a new 
CEO has widely been accepted as one of the biggest decisions a board can make 
in a company. Tian et al. (2011) results find CEO nominations by boards having 
high human and social capital receive a better reaction from the market 
participants. Thus, the results would indicate investor to appreciate human and 
social capital, moreover, the experience and the age of the person who they are 
evaluating.  
 
An older CEO is more likely to step down from a company than a younger 
executive. This is, because the retirement age is closer. For example, when a CEO 
is close to retirement age it might be seen as bigger chance for mandatory 
retirement policies (MRPs). MRPs are positively related to CEO age and are 
proved to have a negative and significant correlation with with the human capital 
of the firm (Cline & Yore, 2015). The study also finds the age of a CEO to be 
significantly negatively correlated with the value of a company. By this, it can be 
assumed that an older CEO is more likely to have MRP and, logically, it will cost 
more money to the company. Furthermore, investor might see an older CEO as a 
negative factor considering future profits of a firm, thus, decreasing stock returns 
from the company.  
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4.3. Education  
 
As age, an education is one way to gain human capital and experience. 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) study shows the CEOs with a background from 
engineer or scientific education or employment have higher sensitivity in 
investment cash flows than CEOs with financial education or employment. 
Thereby, would indicate investors to appreciate financial education over 
technical education while evaluating the risk and measuring the value of the 
company. Furthermore, Malmendier et al. (2005) research shows the 
sensitivity is higher in companies managed by the people born in 1930s, 
during the great depression. All in all, the authors results show personal 
characteristics are important while understanding the companies’ decision 
making which affects to expected earnings to investors.  
 
Bhagat, Bolton & Subramanian (2010) measure impact on CEO education and 
corporation performance. The study does not find a big role in decision-
making by education: if the CEOs performance is unpleasant, the CEO gets 
replaced, regardless their education. However, the education is a significant 
factor while choosing a replacer for dismissed CEO. Furthermore, an 
appointed CEO with a MBA-degree is followed by short-term increase in 
operating performance levels. In contrast, the study does not find a 
significant positive correlation between CEOs education and long-term 
profits. The results would indicate the education not to be a necessity for a 
CEO to manage the company profitably. However, investor might still have 
trust in education and its capability to increase human capital and they would 
prefer an educated alternative over uneducated competitor.  
 
People are more disposed to challenge their own judgment when they feel 
skilled and their knowledge about their awareness is at a great level. Graham, 
Harvey & Huang (2005) examine how investor competence has influence on 
the volume of their trading. Investors who feel more effectual trade more and 
their portfolio is diversified more internationally. In addition, investors with 
high education and income often tend to consider themselves as effectual 
investors. Research shows that female investors and investors with less 
education or lower income do not consider themselves as effectual. Graham 
et al. (2005) do not present such hypothesis as overconfidence or information 
advantage to separate these types of investors.  
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It has been researched that a Master’s Degree in any subject makes people to 
feel more trusting to their actions so people with Master’s Degree even if it is 
not from finance feel more competent making financial decisions. (Graham, 
Harvey & Huang, 2005.) The authors present that in their research 60% of 
investors have finished college and 26% have a post-graduate education.   
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5. SHE’S GOT THE LOOK  
 
“It is amazing how complete is the delusion that beauty in goodness.” – Leo 
Tolstoy. 
 
Previous part of the study has emphasized on perceiving differences in 
demographical factors based on behavior by these factors. Chapter five will 
present previous literature also on outlooks of the executives and how it may 
effect on the performance of the company. Based on the suggestions below, 
market participants might take into concern the appearance of the possible 
executive while valuating the company. In addition, while women have faced 
difficulties to promote to senior management positions, the particular issue 
might make the situation even harder (Oakley, 2000).  
 
 
5.1. Attractiveness and Success 
 
Increasing amount of previous literature seems to support the hypothesis “what 
is beautiful is good”, rather than the hypothesis “beauty is beastly” (Frevert & 
Walker, 2014). Furthermore, the possibilities for a person to promote in his/her 
career based on attractiveness has been studied by many authors. Heilman & 
Saruwatari (1979) find attractiveness to be a positive characteristic while 
applying to managerial position, while attractiveness was a positive factor for 
women only when applying for non-managerial positions. The comprehensive 
study was completed by measuring the ratings of qualifications, references and 
requested salary due to attractiveness. In all of these evaluated factors the 
attractiveness is seen as a positive impact. To conclude, the results show the 
attractiveness to emphasize perceptions between genders even more. Paustian-
Underdahl & Walker (2015) re-examine the effect of attractiveness. The authors 
study finds support for the previous phenomenon in a general population. When 
the study was measured due to answers from human resource professionals, they 
find partial support for the effect. Furthermore, Paustian-Underdahl & Walker 
(2015) show gender being related for managing in male-typed jobs, by indirect 
effect of perceived agency, the one moderated by the attractiveness of the 
applicant.  
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Inferences from faces has been connected to the level of success (Rule & Ambady, 
2009). The authors argue, it may be important especially for women, who are 
often evaluated by their outlooks more carefully. In the study “She’s Got the 
Look: Inferences from Female Chief Executive Officers’ Faces Predict their 
Success”, 170 undergraduates from the United States evaluated 20 female 
executives personality and leadership ability from their faces and then the results 
were compared to same test completed with male executives in the previous 
study. Rule & Ambady (2009) results show the ratings of competence evaluated 
by executive faces predicted performance the of the companies managed by 
evaluated CEOs. Indeed, top executive’s success is, by this, connected with the 
outlooks, regardless of goals and perceived gender.  
 
The positive correlation between attractiveness and likelihood to be hired has 
been studied by many authors (Dion et al. 1972; Stone et al. 1992 & Hosoda et al. 
2003). Indeed, it has been proved attractive people to get more favorable 
references by their previous employers (Gilmore, 1986). However, attractiveness 
can be seen as a disadvantage in situations, especially for female applicants 
(Johnson et al, 2010).  Heilman & Saruwatari (1979) and Heilman & Stopeck 
(1985) studied the “beauty is beastly” effect. The results show attractive women 
applying masculine- or management jobs are less likely to be appointed and they 
have a smaller chance is being promoted with both, unattractive women and all 
male. All in all, in most situations the attractiveness is a plus but there are 
situations where it can be seen as a disadvantage.  
 
Further to hiring situations, attractiveness can play a role as a factor of status and 
appreciation (Frevert & Walker, 2014). For instance, Navy sailors being highly 
attractive compared to fellow competitors were also considered to have a larger 
ability for leadership and to be more intelligent. In addition, the attractive 
applicants were ranked higher than less attractive sailors. The example with 
sailors is a good one, since it extends the discussion not be only concern rivalries 
between attractive female and male but also shows the problem to occur in 
military, which is generally known from its specific career ladders and lack of 
discrimination between male and female applicants. To conclude, it shows it is 
important to focus on discrimination in further researches but also suggest the 
phenomenon is happening due to individuals and human psychology, not due 
to conservative style of making business.  
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Majority of the previous literature has documented positive correlation between 
facial attractiveness of a CEO and firm performance (Langlois et al. 2000). Despite 
the fact, Heilman & Stopeck (1985) find a negative correlation between the 
attractiveness of a female top executive and financial performance of a company. 
Previous studies have often seen masculine characteristics to be considered more 
positively than feminine characteristics (Dawley, Hoffman & Smith, 2004). In 
addition, feminine-appearing women have often been found more attractive than 
masculine-appearing men (Rule & Ambady, 2009). These suggestions would 
indicate masculine male leaders to be more appreciated to promote in their 
career, rather than attractive females.   
 
It is commonly being acceptable to argue the attractiveness to be “in the eye of 
the beholder”. However, research has shown people find certain outlook 
characteristics such as, large eyes, considerable cheekbones and a big smile to be 
associated with attractiveness by both, male and female (Cunningham, 1986). 
While comparing attractive applicants and less attractive peers, the attractive 
applicants are more likely to be hired (Dion, Berscheid & Walster, 1972) and are 
seen as better students (Ritts, Patterson & Tubbs, 1992). The mentioned positive 
outcomes might be due to expectations of performance but are, however, often 
seen to be associated with attractiveness as well (Frevert & Walker, 2014). On the 
other hand, attractiveness can be seen as a negative competitive edge. Frevert & 
Walker (2014) mention the aspect with celebrities. Marilyn Monroe, for example, 
was not considered as being a serious actress during her lifetime (Rollyson, 1987). 
It is not wrong to argue there still exist a way of thinking that beauty and 
intelligence can’t be in the same body by some people.  
 
Although Frevert & Walker (2014) study rejects the “what is beautiful is good” 
hypothesis they, in fact, argue the study to support it. First, in the studies which 
consider beauty as being a disadvantage, beauty can still be a signal of 
competence, albeit the beauty is seen as a threat. Less attractive women and men 
might see attractive females as a bigger threat in competition, especially in places 
which are not task-based. The authors argue that female attractiveness may 
produce competence in hiring decisions, but in work-related resources the 
competition can turn out the beauty to be a threat for competitors. Like this, in 
the study examining the beauty can not be approached, attractive female can 
even be seen as frightening. However, one should not indicate beauty as being a 
negative factor, since attractiveness might be seen as higher status, thus, as a 
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positive factor. In both of the studies by Frevert & Walker (2014) attractiveness is 
still a disseminating factor but does not apply in every situation. Hence, further 
research should emphasize on finding the areas where the discrimination due to 
attractiveness of an applicant actually exists.  
 
A top executive is likely to interact a lot with all stakeholders on daily bases. 
Mulford et al. (1998) studied the correlation between attractiveness and 
cooperation in an exchange by two individuals. The results show individuals 
being in cooperation with the ones they find attractive. In addition, they think 
the attractive individuals to cooperate and interact more active. The link between 
subject ratings about their own attractiveness were positively connected with the 
possibility to cooperate with the ones they found attractive. To conclude, since 
attractiveness is positively correlated with cooperative behavior, it contributes 
people to a productive exchange with attractive people (Mulford et al., 1998). In 
the shade of mentioned previous literature and results, it can be indicated an 
attractive female to be successful in interactive jobs which are trying to cooperate 
with as many clients as possible but promoting to an appreciated top executive 
position might be more difficult. Furthermore, the results would also indicate 
attractive females more likely to be successful in modern businesses rather in the 
conservative male industries, where male executives might see an attractive 
women as different and as a threat to the business.  
    
Even in situations where socializing is considered to be less important, the 
advantages from attractiveness can emerge (Frevert et al., 2014). Dabbs & Stokes, 
1975) use an interesting point of view in their research. The authors studied 
pedestrian’s behavior on the sidewalk. They witnessed the pedestrians to stay 
further from an attractive woman than from less attractive women, giving 
support for the “what is beautiful is unapproachable” phenomenon. The authors 
state attractiveness is followed by social power and with social power people are 
able to move others either mentally and spatially. In addition, people tend to 
leave space between themselves and to those with power leading leaving enough 
distance to attractive people. Hence, the phenomenon can be reached to all 
situations, such as appointing a new top executive, leading the board of the 
company to discriminate attractive people, especially very attractive female 
applicants.  
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5.2. Masculine/Feminine Characteristics and Success 
 
Traditionally, men have been connected more likely with masculine 
characteristics and female with feminine characteristics. Stereotypical male 
characteristics such as independent, aggressive and dominating have been 
valued in business (Broverman et al., 1972). In addition, traditional gender 
stereotypes have seen men being more competitive than women, while women 
are considered to be rather humane and expressive leaders. Furthermore, studies 
have shown men to be rational competitors, active, rational rather than emotional 
and independent leaders, while women are often considered to be lacking in 
these characteristics (Becker, Ayman & Korabik, 2002; Heilman, Block & Martel, 
2002). In addition, some studies have shown male and female to be polar 
opposites, according to many characteristics (Broverman et al., 1972). Next, the 
study will present stereotypical masculine and feminine characteristics and 
present studies which have found correlation between succession in leading a 
company and those characteristics. The increasing amount of the studies 
considering gender stereotypes and their connection to management is due to 
increasing amount of female managers.  
 
Already in 1973, Schein study shows a connection between gender stereotypes 
and perceived characteristics as a requirement to be successful as a manager. The 
first study by Schein (1973) studied the importance of a middle male manager to 
have male characteristics in order to be successful. In extension, Schein (1975) 
studied the same effect with female middle managers. The results suggest 
women are perceived as less qualified for management positions. Furthermore, 
leading to discrimination and affecting negatively to possibilities for a woman 
manager to enter in managerial position (Schein, 1978). In addition, women 
might feel pressure to change their personal characteristics in order to gain 
appreciation and reach top management positions. While feeling need for a 
change in personal traits, it might have an affect to whole type of management, 
thus, making it even more harder for market participants to evaluate managers 
fairly. People are used to categorize everything, including people, and sometimes 
it is difficult to get rid of stereotypes (Stavans & Jaksic, 2011).  
 
Brenner, Tomkiewicz & Schein (1989) renew the study after 15 years. The study 
was completed by questionnaires to both male and female. From the answers by 
men, the authors find a significant similarity between male managers and 
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questionnaires which studied the stereotypical characteristics of males and 
managers (R-square = 0,72). With female, the results were non-significant and 
close to zero, confirming the hypothesis men thinking managers hold 
characteristics common to males more often than characteristics of women.  On 
the other hand, a survey answered by women, produced a bit different results. 
Women saw male (female) managers to have a slightly more characteristics as a 
successful leader with a R-square 0,59 (0,52).  
 
Hence, for female executives, Brenner et al. (1989) results do not show the 
managers to be seen as having more characteristics commonly usual to men 
rather than to women. To conclude, the situation with men did not significantly 
change in 15 years but for women, the issue improved since the last research. 
Men found a successful manager to have characteristics which are stereotypically 
connected to men, while women see a successful manager to have characteristics 
from both genders. Since the situation has changed, it might be due to changes 
in people perceiving women, rather than changes in typical characteristics for a 
successful leader or in the changes of market participants perceiving male 
leaders. Furthermore, Brenner et al. (1989) study shows women seeing other 
females to hold characteristics which are positively correlated to success. Women 
even saw female leaders more likely to have certain positive characteristics to be 
more likely possessed by female than male managers. The results indicate middle 
manager positions to get rid of discrimination due to gender of the applicant. 
More importantly, the study proves female managers to act more equally than 
men in appointment, promotion and placement decisions (Brenner et al, 1989). 
Results would indicate that women have broke the “glass ceiling” but men still 
got work to do going towards discrimination free and equal society.  
 
If there would not be the “glass ceilings”, the particular researches would not be 
necessary. In a situation where it can be expected that market participants will 
behave irrationally and will let discrimination to affect their judgment, the issue 
needs to be studied. Even though the chapter did not present the subject based 
on the outlook of the CEO, the studies presented in the chapter are still relevant 
for the research and to the investor reaction. In the same way, the CEOs may be 
evaluated based on their outlooks by the market participants either consciously 
or unconsciously. An attractive CEO gets more attention from the crowd than a 
less attractive CEO. By this, in the light of some researches, the companies should 
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pay attention on CEO attractiveness and to other demographic differences as 
well.  
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
By this chapter, the study will introduce the data which will be used, from where 
the data is collected and with what methodology the research will approach the 
particular issue. In addition, it explains by certain methods of collecting the data 
are used and why it was necessary in order to complete the research properly. 
Furthermore, the chapter will present the hypothesis of the research, due to 
reading the empirical results in chapter 7.  
 
 
6.1. Data Description  
 
The research will obtain a sample of announcement of top executives in the U.S. 
companies from January 1 2006 to December 31 2015. In this research, top 
executives refer to CEOs. The research examines the stock price reactions, so the 
sample consists of public companies only. Furthermore, the company needs to 
be public for 252 trading days before and 10 days after the particular executive 
appointment in order to get in to the sample. This is for Beta and Alpha to get 
proper calculations. Furthermore, the 252-day period covers the whole year and 
eliminates the possible yearly effects from the stock price. The study will explore 
all kinds of companies and will not be biased towards large or small firms. The 
data concerning the top executive appointments is from ExecuComp and the 
exact announcement dates are collected from American business journal articles 
(Wall Street Journal, Businesswire, Forbes, Reuters and Business Insider). The 
historical stock prices are collected from Yahoo Finance.  
 
Lee & James (2007) find 17 observations of a female CEO appointment between 
years 1990 and 2000. A significant number of female executives have been 
appointed in the 21st century. The study finds 3345 observations on top executive 
appointments of which 121 are females. To match the study with previous, it uses 
the nominations of the CEO’s only. Out of 149 observations 78 were CEO’s.  After 
deleting the other than CEO appointments, the sample finally reduced to 64 
observations due to missing or incomplete stock returns by 14 companies. By this, 
the study extends the research to the 21st century and tries to improve the sample 
and the result.  
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After collecting the sample of 64 observations and historical stock prices, the 
study finds 64 comparable observations from the appointed male CEO 
announcements. To make the sample comparable with women, it uses 
observations from the same industry and in the same time period as in the sample 
of female CEO’s. After collecting the results of both samples the study calculates 
the average results of the 64 observations.  
 
 
6.2. Hypothesis 
 
Due to the arguments mentioned above, the study will include the following 
hypothesis. At first, the study measures the impact of a new female top executive 
appointment on the company’s stock price. Based on the arguments stated above, 
the correlation should be negative. 
 
H1: The reaction in stock price to a female CEO appointment will be negative 
 
Secondly, the previous literature suggests the impact to be more negative when 
appointing a new female top executive than male top executive. 
 
H2: The reaction in stock price will be less negative for an appointment of a male 
CEO than for an appointment of a female CEO 
 
Thirdly, top executives such as CEO’s based on the arguments earlier in the study 
are more appreciated if they have gained more experience in previous years. 
When a person gets older he is more likely to get more experience as well. The 
study combines the samples of both male and female, calculates the median age 
(53) and divides the sample in half (less than 53-years-old and over 53-years-old).  
 
H3: The reaction in stock price to an appointment of a less than 53-year-old CEO 
will be negative 
 
Finally, the study examines the differences between younger and older half of 
appointed CEO’s. Older half of the CEO’s have gained more experience in their 
life based on lived years. Thus, investor might prefer the older half of appointed 
CEO’s more. 
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H4: The reaction in the stock price will be more positive for older half of the 
CEO’s  
 
 
6.3. Research Methodology 
 
While measuring investor reaction to a certain event as an issue, the change in 
stock price needs to be taken under consideration. Therefore, the study is done 
by event study methodology. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) present the event 
study methodology to estimate abnormal returns. After the research, the event 
study methodology has been widely used in accounting, economics and finance 
in scenarios such as earnings announcements and money supply announcements 
to measure the security price reaction to these announcements. In addition, the 
event study methodology has become a standard way of examining the impact 
of a certain event to a security’s price (Binder, 1998).  
 
First part of the empirical study finds whether the investor reaction to an 
appointment of a female CEO is negative. The research measures the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) to examine the impact. The window is 21 days (-10 - 
+10) from the first public announcement of a female CEO. Second part finds the 
difference in the impact between male and female CEO. The study examines with 
21-day (-10 - +10) CARs of how the effect is different with male and female CEO. 
After examining the differences in market participant’s reactions towards 
different genders, the study takes the aspect of CEOs age to the research.  The 
study compares the difference in the change of stocks 21-day CARs from -10 to 
+10 days after the announcement of a less than 53-year-old CEO appointment. 
The final part of the study finds whether the impact is smaller when a person 
hired to the CEO position is older than 53. The study measures the 21-day CARs 
(-10 - +10) to estimate the impact of market participant reactions.   
 
There are certain problems while estimating the right event window to calculate 
accurate cumulative abnormal returns when using event study methodology. 
First, on the day of the announcement, the market might have already been 
closed before the press release or other type of announcement. Therefore, the 
event window must be extended further the actual announcement date to include 
to investor reaction properly. Secondly, it is important to start the event window 
before the actual announcement date. The markets are not efficient and some 
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market participants might have insider information, in other words, get the 
information before the actual press release and before major part of the market 
participants get the information. In addition, market participants might 
anticipate the future information, which is about to be announced.  
 
To estimate the effect, the study calculates the expected return, abnormal return 
and cumulative abnormal return in the event-study-period, which is 21 days. 
Furthermore, the research uses t-test of abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal return to measure if the results are statistically significant. In event-
study-methodology it is important to eliminate the other effects in the market to 
find the effect of a certain event to the stock price. At first, in longer time-period 
the individual impacts invalidate each other and the standard deviation matches 
the stocks real standard deviation better. In addition, the 263 trading days cover 
the entire trading year and the possible yearly anomalies, such as, the January 
effect can be eliminated. The study uses historical stock prices from 263 trading 
days (from -252 trading days to +10 trading days) to calculate the Beta and Alpha 
of the stock. By this, the expected return of the stock is calculated. In addition, 
the comparable index prices (S&P500) are used from same time period. The index 
returns of a comparable index need to be taken into research to see how the 
market has changed in the examined period. Furthermore, it helps to eliminate 
the effects concerning the whole market and eases finding the influence of a 
certain event to the to market participants reaction and by this to company’s stock 
price.  
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Chapter 7 will present the empirical results of the study. The chapter shows 
tables and figures to demonstrate the results. All the following tables will have 
six columns and the leftmost will show the date related to the announcement. For 
example, day zero is the day of the announcement and -5 is five days before the 
announcement. In contrast, 5 in the leftmost column equals five days after the 
announcement. Second column from the left presents the stocks expected return 
during that day. Third and fourth column present the stocks abnormal return 
and cumulative abnormal return. Finally, columns five and six present the t-test 
measures of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. The tables show 
the exact numbers but to help the illustration, they will be followed by figures.  
 
 
7.1. The Empirical Results between Genders 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the female CEO sample. The R-Square of the sample 
is 0,37, which means 37% of the stocks movement can be explained by the 
movements in S&P500. The cumulative abnormal return of the sample is 0,04%. 
On the other hand, the stock return of the announcement day is -0,50%. In 
addition, when the event-study-window is changed, naturally the results also 
change. Table 3 shows the 11 trading day window from -5 days to +5 days gives 
a negative 0,02% return in the stock price. Furthermore, reducing the period to 5 
days (-2 to +2 days) and moving closer to the exact announcement days gives a 
result of -0,69% in stock price. The t-tests of abnormal returns in 21-day event-
study-period are ranging from 0,22 to -0,24 and none of them are statistically 
significant. The t-test of cumulative abnormal returns is 0,12, thus, not 
statistically significant. The results indicate the glass ceiling not to exist anymore 
towards female CEO’s. The Tables 2 & 3 are followed by figures 1 & 2, which 
demonstrate the movements of daily abnormal return and cumulative abnormal 
return during the 21-day event-study time-period of the study. 
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  Table 2. The Event-Study results of the female CEO sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
t [E] r AR CAR AR t-test CAR t-test 
-10 0,00 % 0,10 % 0,10 % -0,02 -0,02 
-9 0,20 % -0,13 % -0,03 % -0,12 -0,14 
-8 0,55 % 0,45 % 0,42 % 0,22 0,08 
-7 0,19 % 0,18 % 0,60 % 0,04 0,13 
-6 -0,15 % -0,25 % 0,34 % -0,10 0,03 
-5 0,12 % 0,11 % 0,46 % 0,17 0,20 
-4 -0,08 % 0,12 % 0,58 % 0,13 0,32 
-3 0,07 % -0,06 % 0,52 % -0,02 0,30 
-2 0,15 % 0,10 % 0,61 % 0,03 0,33 
-1 0,04 % -0,10 % 0,52 % -0,10 0,23 
0 0,00 % -0,50 % 0,02 % -0,24 -0,01 
1 0,19 % -0,14 % -0,11 % -0,08 -0,09 
2 0,31 % -0,06 % -0,18 % -0,02 -0,11 
3 -0,06 % 0,18 % 0,01 % 0,08 -0,03 
4 -0,21 % 0,22 % 0,23 % 0,14 0,11 
5 0,19 % 0,09 % 0,32 % -0,02 0,09 
6 0,14 % -0,32 % 0,00 % -0,08 0,01 
7 -0,23 % -0,23 % -0,23 % -0,16 -0,15 
8 0,36 % 0,31 % 0,09 % 0,19 0,03 
9 0,03 % -0,01 % 0,08 % -0,06 -0,03 
10 -0,18 % -0,04 % 0,04 % 0,15 0,12 
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Female       
Cumulative period CAR %  t-test 
-10 - +10   0,04 % 0,12 
-5 - +5  -0,02 % 0,06 
-2 to +2   -0,69 % -0,41 
 
    Table 3. The comparison between different time-windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 1. The average abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
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 Figure 2. The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
The results of the male CEO sample give different aspect in Table 4. At first, the 
R-Square of the whole sample is 0,28, so 28% of the movements in stock price are 
explained by the movements in S&P500. The R-Square of the male CEO sample 
is 0,09 smaller than in female CEO sample. Secondly, the cumulative abnormal 
return of the sample is -0,04%, thus, the reaction by investor towards male CEO’s 
is more negative than towards female CEO’s. However, the reaction by 
shareholders in the day of the announcement of the appointed CEO increases the 
stock price by 0,91%. That is almost 1,5% more positive than with the 
announcements of the female CEO’s. It can be clearly seen from Table 5 that the 
effect in stock price improves when shortening the event-study-period. At first, 
from -5 trading days to +5 trading days the the cumulative abnormal return in 
0,58%. Furthermore, decreasing the period to only 5 trading days, the CAR is 
0,98%. The t-tests of abnormal returns range from 0,43 to -0,32 and are not 
statistically significant. The t-test of cumulative abnormal return from 21 trading 
day period is 0,03 and is not statistically significant. Figures 3 & 4 ease the 
demonstration on movements in daily abnormal return and in 21-day cumulative 
abnormal return. 
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  Table 4. The Event-Study results of the male CEO sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
t [E] r AR CAR AR t-test CAR t-test 
-10 -0,23 % -0,19 % -0,19 % -0,06 -0,06 
-9 0,16 % -0,12 % -0,31 % -0,03 -0,09 
-8 -0,37 % 0,03 % -0,28 % 0,02 -0,07 
-7 -0,03 % -0,20 % -0,48 % -0,12 -0,20 
-6 0,31 % -0,22 % -0,70 % -0,21 -0,40 
-5 0,03 % -0,13 % -0,83 % 0,04 -0,36 
-4 -0,32 % 0,17 % -0,66 % 0,17 -0,19 
-3 0,13 % -0,01 % -0,67 % 0,01 -0,18 
-2 -0,38 % -0,39 % -1,06 % -0,08 -0,26 
-1 0,16 % 0,27 % -0,79 % 0,28 0,02 
0 -0,34 % 0,91 % 0,12 % 0,43 0,45 
1 0,16 % 0,45 % 0,57 % 0,16 0,62 
2 -0,20 % -0,27 % 0,31 % 0,02 0,64 
3 0,39 % 0,06 % 0,37 % -0,04 0,60 
4 0,12 % -0,35 % 0,02 % -0,28 0,31 
5 0,00 % -0,14 % -0,12 % -0,18 0,14 
6 -0,02 % 0,24 % 0,13 % 0,13 0,27 
7 -0,04 % -0,09 % 0,04 % -0,06 0,21 
8 -0,43 % 0,50 % 0,53 % 0,30 0,51 
9 0,16 % -0,39 % 0,15 % -0,16 0,35 
10 -0,07 % -0,19 % -0,04 % -0,32 0,03 
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     Table 5. The comparison between different time-windows.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3. The average abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
 
 
 
Male       
Cumulative period CAR %  t-test 
-10 - +10   -0,04 % 0,03 
-5 - +5   0,58 % 0,54 
-2 to +2   0,98 % 0,81 
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 Figure 4. The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
While measuring individual appointments and their affection on the company’s 
stock price, the results were relatively high, comparing to to average of all data. 
Naturally, since the individual results were both, negative and positive. With a 
different sample or by using only a part of the sample, the results might have 
been significant to either of the directions. Next, the study will present some of 
the individual results of the market reaction to a CEO appointment.  
 
For example, Advanced Micro Device- company stock gained 10,22% cumulative 
abnormal return in a 21-day-period around the announcement date. The female 
CEO who was appointed, clearly affected a large reaction by the market 
participants. The t-test of the cumulative abnormal return is 3,98, which is 
statistically significant in 0,001 level. In contrast, the Coldwater Creek Inc. stock 
suffered a 16,60% decrease by cumulative abnormal return around the 
appointment of a new female CEO. Even greater decrease occurs with 
NutriSystem Inc. At the day of the announcement, the company’s stocks 
abnormal return plunged 12,46% and the t-test of the abnormal return was 6,15. 
10 days after the announcement, which is also the last day of the measured 21-
day-period, the cumulative abnormal return is -24,31% and the t-test is significant 
-12,00. It can be argued, that the market reacts quite heavily to the appointment 
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of the new female CEO. The shareholders of NutriSystem Inc. might have some 
prejudice towards female executives. Similarly, the IBM stock decreased 5,63% 
cumulative abnormal return in 21 days while a female CEO is appointed to the 
company and the t-test of the cumulative abnormal return is -7,25, which is 
statistically significant at the level of 0,001.  
 
As with the results of female CEO appointments, the results of the male CEOs 
were contradictory as well. First, Starbucks stock increased a significant 10,83% 
cumulative abnormal return in 21 days around the announcement date. Only at 
the specific day of the announcement, the stock increased rapidly by almost 10% 
abnormal return duo to strong reaction by the market participants. With 
Starbucks, the t-test of the stock return was a significant 3,57 on the day of the 
announcement and the cumulative t-test of the whole 21-day period it was a 
significant 9,20.  
 
The Gap Inc. stock gained almost 12% cumulative abnormal return on the 21-day 
measuring period, with the t-test of -8,89. In contrast, the HCP Inc. cumulative 
abnormal return during the 21-day period was a positive 11,05% and the t-test of 
the CAR is 8,29, which is significantly positive at 0,001 level. Again, a clear 
anticipation and reaction by the market participants towards the appointment of 
a new CEO of the company.  
 
By the individual results of the companies’ stock returns, it can be said, that 
market participants anticipate, react and follow the markets before and after of a 
CEO appointment. Sometimes it is impossible for investor to measure when a 
company might appoint a new CEO, but for example if a company has just fired 
a CEO, the market participants can expect the company to hire a new chief 
executive officer sometime in the near future. Secondly, it definitely seems to 
have an effect on investor while the company hires a new CEO. The results 
between genders are not that big, but the individual results and the cumulative 
abnormal returns show the market participants to anticipate and react to the 
appointment of a new chief executive officer. In the future, it would be interesting 
to see whether the change of a CEO has an impact to the company’s stock price 
in a longer time-period that 21 days around the announcement.  
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7.2. The Empirical Results with Different Age of a CEO 
 
Investor seem to react almost equally on the appointment of female and male 
CEO’s. This chapter will study whether the age of the appointed CEO has impact 
on investors, thus, to stock price as well. As mentioned, the sample consists both 
appointments of male and female CEO’s and is split in half by median age of the 
sample, which is 53. At first, the Table 6 shows the results of the younger half of 
appointed CEO’s. As can be seen, the cumulative abnormal return of the research 
is 0,36% and the t-test gives a result of 0,06, which is not statistically significant. 
The R-square of the sample is 0,45, meaning 45% of the results can be explained 
by the movements in the comparable index. The abnormal daily returns in the 
21-day-period are in the range between 0,54% to -0,28%. The t-tests calculated 
with same abnormal returns give values between 0,33 and -0,16. By this, the 
results are not statistically significant. As with the sample of male CEO’s, the 
impact of investors on stock price with younger half of the CEO’s at first 
improves while the event-study-window decreases (Table 7). However, when 
decreasing the period to 5 days, the reaction of the investors becomes negative. 
For example, -2 to +2 days-window gives -0,25% cumulative abnormal return 
and the t-test of 0,03. The other differences in abnormal returns when changing 
the event-study window can be seen from Table 6. In addition, the tables 6 & 7 
are followed by abnormal returns around the announcement date and 21-day 
cumulative abnormal return figures 5 & 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54	
	
	
 
  Table 6. The Event-Study results of under 53-year-old CEO’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
t [E] r AR CAR AR t-test CAR t-test 
-10 -0,02 % -0,04 % -0,04 % -0,04 -0,04 
-9 0,04 % -0,26 % -0,30 % -0,14 -0,19 
-8 0,53 % 0,29 % -0,01 % 0,14 -0,04 
-7 -0,14 % 0,06 % 0,05 % -0,09 -0,13 
-6 -0,07 % -0,36 % -0,31 % -0,22 -0,35 
-5 -0,12 % 0,01 % -0,30 % 0,01 -0,34 
-4 -0,11 % 0,54 % 0,24 % 0,33 -0,01 
-3 0,17 % -0,14 % 0,10 % -0,11 -0,13 
-2 -0,21 % -0,16 % -0,06 % -0,08 -0,21 
-1 0,25 % -0,19 % -0,25 % -0,14 -0,35 
0 -0,18 % 0,08 % -0,17 % 0,08 -0,27 
1 0,03 % -0,09 % -0,26 % 0,14 -0,13 
2 0,09 % 0,11 % -0,15 % 0,03 -0,10 
3 0,01 % 0,15 % -0,01 % 0,01 -0,09 
4 -0,25 % 0,33 % 0,33 % 0,18 0,09 
5 0,10 % 0,23 % 0,55 % 0,02 0,11 
6 0,08 % -0,28 % 0,27 % -0,16 -0,05 
7 -0,10 % -0,05 % 0,23 % -0,08 -0,13 
8 -0,21 % 0,50 % 0,73 % 0,23 0,10 
9 0,14 % -0,13 % 0,60 % -0,13 -0,03 
10 -0,21 % -0,24 % 0,36 % -0,03 -0,06 
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Table 7. The comparison between different time-windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5. The average abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
 
 
Under 53       
Cumulative period CAR %  t-test 
-10 - +10   0,36 % -0,06 
-5 - +5   0,86 % 0,46 
-2 to +2   -0,25 % 0,03 
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 Figure 6. The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
 
The results shown in Table 8 describe the investor reaction to over 53-year-old 
CEO appointment. The cumulative abnormal return in the whole 21-day period 
is -0,34%. When comparing the effect to younger half of the appointed CEO’s, it 
can be seen that older CEO’s are more appreciated by investors. The daily 
abnormal returns in Figure 7 vary from 0,50% to -0,39%. In addition, the t-tests 
of the same daily abnormal returns are in the range of 0,23 and -0,28 and are not 
statistically significant. The t-test of the cumulative abnormal returns during the 
whole 21-day period is -0,08 and is not statistically significant. Again, like with 
younger half of the CEO’s as well, the impact seems to increase while shortening 
the event-study-period. The changes can be seen from Table 9. The daily 
abnormal return and cumulative 21-day abnormal returns are followed after 
Table 9 in Figures 7 & 8.    
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t [E] r AR CAR AR t-test CAR t-test 
-10 -0,07 % -0,14 % -0,14 % -0,04 -0,04 
-9 0,33 % 0,03 % -0,11 % -0,01 -0,05 
-8 -0,31 % 0,20 % 0,09 % 0,07 0,02 
-7 0,12 % -0,04 % 0,04 % -0,01 0,01 
-6 0,18 % -0,07 % -0,02 % -0,09 -0,08 
-5 0,21 % -0,06 % -0,08 % 0,15 0,07 
-4 -0,24 % -0,09 % -0,17 % 0,02 0,09 
-3 0,12 % 0,26 % 0,09 % 0,16 0,25 
-2 -0,08 % -0,14 % -0,05 % 0,01 0,26 
-1 -0,01 % -0,01 % -0,06 % 0,14 0,39 
0 -0,24 % 0,50 % 0,44 % 0,23 0,62 
1 0,32 % 0,06 % 0,50 % -0,15 0,47 
2 -0,14 % -0,39 % 0,11 % -0,04 0,43 
3 0,31 % 0,13 % 0,24 % 0,01 0,45 
4 0,11 % -0,37 % -0,13 % -0,28 0,16 
5 0,09 % -0,15 % -0,27 % -0,17 -0,01 
6 0,04 % 0,23 % -0,04 % 0,20 0,20 
7 -0,07 % -0,26 % -0,30 % -0,17 0,02 
8 0,11 % 0,24 % -0,06 % 0,19 0,21 
9 0,07 % -0,15 % -0,21 % -0,04 0,18 
10 -0,01 % -0,13 % -0,34 % -0,26 -0,08 
 
Table 8. The Event-Study results of over 53-year-old CEO’s. 
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    Table 9. The comparison between different time-windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
    Figure 7. The average abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
 
Over 53       
Cumulative period CAR %  t-test 
-10 - +10   -0,34 % -0,08 
-5 - +5   -0,25 % -0,01 
-2 to +2   0,02 % 0,18 
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Figure 8. The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
 
It can be seen from all of the tables that negative and positive reaction by 
investors are happening before and after the announcement date. Investor clearly 
anticipate the announcement as well as react to the announcement afterwards. 
The appointment of a CEO clearly has an impact on investors and the appointing 
of a new CEO is an important job. Especially with male CEO’s the reaction of the 
investors during the announcement day was substantial, as the abnormal return 
was almost 1%.  
 
All in all, the results with male and female CEOs and between younger and older 
half of the CEOs were interesting, especially when measuring the individual 
results. At first, one might think the market to react more positively to an older 
and by this, more experienced CEO, than to freshly graduated in his mid-thirties 
being young CEO. Naturally, the industry and company explain at least part of 
the phenomenon. Some industries and companies require young and attractive 
executive to lead the company. Sometimes they might not even participate to the 
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management of the company and are only figureheads. In contrast, other 
companies require strong leadership by the CEO. By these and other arguments, 
the investor evaluate each executive carefully and form their opinion of how they 
are capable of running the company.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main purpose of the study is to examine how the company’s stock price is 
affected when the chief executive officer changes. Especially, the study 
emphasizes on demographical differences between the appointed Chief 
Executive Officers. CEO is the head of the company and the research finds how 
investor perceive demographically different people as company leaders. The 
research questions are studied with event-study-methodology and the results 
show there is a difference in investors reaction measured by different samples 
divided by demographical factors, which in this study consists of gender and age 
of the executive. Even when the other movements of the market are eliminated 
or reduced, it is hard to estimate the impact of a certain event on stock price. 
However, the study shows investors and by this the stock price reacts differently 
towards demographically different CEO’s. After collecting the historical stock 
prices and comparable index prices of every 128 nominations, the study 
calculated the Beta and the Alpha to calculate the expected return of the stock. 
By this, the abnormal returns are calculated by deducting the expected return of 
the stock from the actual return of the stock. Thus, if the actual return in larger 
than expected return, the stock has gained positive abnormal return. Finally, it 
calculates the cumulative abnormal returns and the t-tests for abnormal returns 
and cumulative abnormal returns to measure whether the results of the study are 
statistically significant.   
 
The most interesting aspect of the results is definitely the comparison on male 
and female CEO appointments. As mentioned, the previous literature finds 
contradictory results of the subject. For example, Lee & James (2007) find the 
investor and by their actions the stock price of the company to gain almost 4 % 
abnormal returns in stock price. In contrast to previous literature, the study does 
not find a significant reaction by the market participants towards the 
appointments of new CEOs. The results would indicate that investor have break 
the “glass ceiling” and female CEO are not unappreciated or relatively new and 
risky candidates anymore. The number of female executive is increasing and the 
main purpose of the study was to find how investor perceive the female CEO’s 
after 15 years. In other words, have the market participants become less 
conservative in the past 15 years. The difference in cumulative abnormal returns 
in the male and female CEO 21-days event-study-period is not much (0,08%) but 
it is way less than in in the study examined in the 1990s by Lee & James (2007). 
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In the study average decrease in the stock price was -3,71% with female CEO 
appointment and -0,49% with male CEO’s. From Lee & James study the 
difference has decreased over 3% and even turned upside down. The first 
hypothesis of the study was that investors react negatively to the appointment of 
a female CEO. The hypothesis gets rejected in the 21-day event-study period.  
 
There might be many explanations to the changed phenomenon. The study is 
made with a will to see whether the investor have changed their way of 
perceiving female CEOs and the results seem to prove it. Women have been 
increasingly nominated to top management positions and investor might not see 
them as risky and relatively new alternatives comparing to male candidates 
anymore. By this, since there has been 15 years when Lee and James (2007) made 
their research, a lot has changed and the gender of a CEO does not seem to have 
an influence on investor decisions.  
 
The second hypothesis of the study was the investor to react more positively to 
the appointment of a male CEO than to nomination on a female CEO. Table 1 and 
3 in chapter 7 present the results. In the 21-day event-study-period, the reaction 
of the investor towards male CEOs was -0,04% in cumulative abnormal returns. 
In contrast, the similar results with appointments of the female CEOs show a 
positive 0,04% CAR of the stock. By this, also the second hypothesis of the study 
gets rejected. Naturally the effect changes a bit if the perspective and the window 
of the study changes. For example, if the only focused change in stock price is 
only the day of the announcement, the reaction turns upside down with 0,91% 
change in stock price with male CEOs and -0,50% abnormal return with the 
appointment of a female CEO. However, one day is definitely not enough to 
measure the effect of the CEO appointment so 21-day period offers better and 
more reliable results to the event-study-methodology. Measuring only the day of 
the announcement does not offer any anticipation nor later reactions by investor. 
Even though the results of the study with the gender part are not statistically 
significant, it offers a completely different reaction comparing to previous 
research of the subject and shows the investor to treat CEO candidates equally 
and not to pay attention to the gender of a CEO anymore.  
 
After going through the results of the impact of the CEOs gender to market 
participant’s reaction is time to move towards the influence of a CEOs age to 
investors. As mentioned, the sample consisting of both male and female CEO 
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observations is split in half by median age. Tables 5 and 7 offer interesting results. 
Usually with age comes more experience, thus investor might see an older CEO 
candidate as a safer option than a younger competitor. The results of the study 
give contrary results. Investor react more negatively to older half of the sample. 
More specifically, under 53-year-old CEO nomination give an average of 0,36% 
cumulative abnormal return while the other half gains -0,04% of cumulative 
abnormal return. The results would indicate investor to see an older CEO as a 
riskier option. The reaction might be due to closer retirement age and by this 
another change in the company’s CEO position. Younger CEOs might also be 
more capable of managing the public relationships in the eyes of an investor. The 
third hypothesis of the research was investor to react negatively on relatively 
young CEO. Based on the results, the hypothesis gets rejected. Again, the results 
are not statistically significant but the numbers offer interesting view to the 
questions regarding the investors reaction and possible discrimination towards 
the appointed CEOs age. Finally, the fourth and last the hypothesis of the 
research was the investor to react more positively to an older CEO appointment. 
Based on the results of tables 5 and 7, the hypothesis gets rejected.  
 
The results discussed above are average results of the sample. The individual 
observations of the results also offered interesting results and a couple of them 
should also be mentioned. Car industry can be seen as a typical male industry 
and the appointment of a female CEO Mary Barra is good to be discussed. 
Investor might think a female is not a right person to lead a company from the 
car industry. However, when Mary Barra was nominated in December 2013, the 
cumulative abnormal return for General Motors was 5,66%. Definitely a strong 
reaction by investor. Another individual example of a female CEO nomination is 
the appointment of Avon Products CEO Sherilyn S. McCoy in April 2012. The 
Avon Products stock price cumulative abnormal return on a 21-day-period was 
a positive 20,27% with the t-test of 10,75, which is statistically significant at 0,001 
level.   
 
All in all, the results of the research were interesting and they offered new points 
of view to earlier literature of the subject. It is not too much to say that investor 
have brake the “glass ceiling” and discrimination towards female company 
leaders does not appear anymore. In addition, the nomination of a new CEO 
seems to have a connection to investor reaction and to stock price. By this, 
companies need to evaluate properly who is the right person to be in charge of 
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the company. Furthermore, the timing of the announcement should be properly 
planned. However, even the research shows the appointment of a new CEO has 
an impact on company’s stock price, the demographical factors of the new CEO 
do not play as big of a role as they used to do. Based on the results of the study, 
the age seems to have a larger impact on investor decision than the gender of the 
CEO. Comparing to results from the study by Lee & James (2007) the number of 
female CEOs and the number of female investor has increased. Together the two 
changes explain a part of the results. Other explanation is investor have become 
less conservative and are not afraid of female CEOs anymore.  
 
Investors reaction towards different CEOs is an interesting aspect and it needs to 
be studied more. New female top managers are hired and the number of 
observations and announcements increase. By this, in the future the samples of 
announcements increase and it is possible to get even more accurate results. Also, 
in the future literature, it would be interesting to see also other demographical 
factors and their impact to the investor reaction. For example, how the ethnical 
background of a CEO has an effect on the company’s stock price.  
 
Some countries are also considered to be relatively conservative while comparing 
to less conservative countries. While the amount of data grows and the number 
of female executive increases, it would be interesting to see in further research, 
whether for example investor in Finland and in the United States react differently 
on demographically different CEOs. At the moment, a study such as this, is not 
possible to do by the data collected from the companies in Finland, since the 
number of female CEOs is not sufficient.  
 
The previous studies of the subject have only considered the markets of the 
United States. As mentioned, the reason might be the lack of data of the 
insufficient number of female CEOs. However, the number of female CEOs in 
Thailand is 49 per cent (Grant Thornton, 2013). By this, since the number of 
female and male CEOs is equal, the results of the similar study would be 
interesting. Also, an interesting factor for the further research might be the 
information of male and female as a portion of the whole number of the investor. 
If the number of male investor significantly beats the number of female investor 
and the market reacts negatively to female CEO appointment, it can be argued, 
that male investor are afraid of demographically different CEO and do not trust 
her. On the other hand, in a similar situation when the market reacts positively, 
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the reason might be something else, for example that investor have break the 
glass ceiling and trust equally both genders and demographically different 
people. In this case, also the promotion possibilities would be equal to both, male 
and female employees.  
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